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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
J 0 S E PH P. McCARREN d/b/a 
McCARREN PLUMBING AND 
HEATING CO., 
Plaintiff and Respondent~ Case No. 
9857 
vs. 
CHARLES S. MERRILL, 
Defendant and A ppcllant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Charles S. Merrill, defendant below, has appealed 
from a judgment awarding to plaintiff $1510.90 for 
services and materials furnished by the plaintiff at 
defendant's request on certain residential rental prop-
erty owned by defendant in Salt Lake County. Plain-
tiff and respondent cross appeals for attorney's fees 
under the contract. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Judge Stewart M. Hanson awarded judgment to 
the plaintiff in the sum of $1510.90, dismissed defend-
ant's counterclaim, and denied plaintiff any attorney 
fees. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks the court to affirm the judg-
ment of Judge Hanson on the merits of the case and 
to reverse his decision insofar as he refused the plain-
tiff attorney's fees under the agreement. 
CROSS APPEAL 
Plaintiff hereby cross appeals to the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah from that part of the decree 
of the court in the above entitled cause dated December 
14, 1962 denying plaintiff a reasonable attorney's fef 
in accordance with the prayer of plaintiff's complaint. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts of the appellant in his brief 
is, to a large extent, the argument made by respondent 
and defendant below rather than a statement of the 
facts as found by the District Judge. It is necessary, 
therefore, to restate the facts in accordance with the 
lower court's ruling and the evidence. 
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Plaintiff Joseph P. McCarren is a licensed plumber 
in Salt Lake County, Utah, and was duly authorized 
under such licenses to perform plumbing services during 
the month of October, 1960 to and including the date 
of the trial (Findings of Fact No. 1, R. 20, 46, 47). 
Plaintiff has had 20 years experience as a plumber, 
but prior to the time in question had never dealt with 
the defendant (R. 47). Immediately prior to the time 
of the execution of the written agreement between the 
parties, in evidence as plaintiff's Exhibit 1, plaintiff 
called upon the defendant in response to a telephone 
call from J. Price Company at the defendant's resi-
dence at 1975 Millcreek Way and discussed with the 
defendant work which defendant required (R. 48). 
Plaintiff testified that he explained to the defend-
ant that on all his jobs he billed every 30 days and 
expected them to pay by the lOth of the month so that 
plaintiff could meet his obligations (R. 48). The de-
fendant explained that he wanted the plumbing wol'k 
done "right away". Plaintiff therefore commenced 
work immediately (R. 60). Plaintiff testified that it 
was not his custom to fill in the blank on the f onn 
contract he used under the heading "Payments to be 
Made as Follows", but that he customarily billed his 
customers monthly, and that he was not in the finance 
business and could not afford to finance construction 
(R. 60-61). Most of the longhand insertions on Ex-
hibit 1 appear in plaintiff's handwriting, but Mr. 1\tler·-
rill examined the contract in detail and the language 
with respect to the water sprinkler and related infor-
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mation on the right hand side of the page is in defend-
ant's handwriting (R. 49). The court expressly found 
that ''defendant and plaintiff agreed that the defendant 
would pay to the plaintiff for materials furnished and 
services rendered, pursuant to said contract, on or be-
fore the lOth [of the] month after the month in which 
the same were furnished, and the plaintiff would render 
a statement to the defendant at the end of such calendar 
month during the period of time such materials and 
services were furnished and performed." Thus the 
court expressly adopted plaintiff's version of the con-
tract and rejected the defendant's testimony to the 
effect that there was no such conversation. 
It was plaintiff's practice to require his employees 
to write up a job ticket at the end of each day describing 
the material installed and the time spent on the job. 
Where material is in addition to the work described 
in the contract, the word "extra" is placed on the ticket. 
These tickets are retained by the plaintiff in the normal 
course of the business as a normal part of his usual 
and ordinary business records. . The information re-
flected on the tickets is tabulated and transmitted onto 
a ledger sheet. Plaintiff's job tickets on the defendant's 
building project were marked collectively as Exhibit 
2. They reflect in detail the materials used and the work 
performed each day. They support the conclusion, 
taking into account plaintiff's normal practice and in 
the light of his twenty years' experience as a plumber, 
that the fair and reasonable value of the labor per-
formed and materials furnished on the premises at 1975 
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1\iillcreek Way between October 5, 1960 and the middle 
of November, 1960, was in the sum of $2110.90. The 
court found that $288.14 of such amount was addi-
tional to the items contemplated by the parties as re-
flected in the written agreement, said items being desig-
nated as "extra" by plaintiff (Finding No. 3, R. 21). 
The court expressly found that on or about No-
vember I, 1960, plaintiff rendered an invoice to the 
defendant in the sum of $1800. (Finding No. 4, R. 21). 
This finding was in accordance with plaintiff's testi-
mony. Plaintiff testified that Mr. Merrill visited the 
premises practically every day; that he did not make 
any objections concerning the status or quality of the 
work. It is not plaintiff's practice to keep copies of 
invoices because the information reflected by the invoice 
is simply taken from his ledger (R. 53). Plaintiff tes-
tified that on or about the lOth of November he called 
Mr. Merrill and inquired if he could draw some money 
on the job. Mr. J\!Ierrill responded that he could not 
pay him, that he was having trouble with the federal 
government but that he would send a check shortly. 
Plaintiff continued to work on the job until N ove1nher 
16 (R. 53, Exhibit 2). Approximately December 20 
or 21, plaintiff discussed the question of payment at 
the Deseret Mortuary, and defendant promised plain-
tiff a check for $1,000 "in the next day or so". "I told 
him I needed the money to pay my bills, and, well, 
things were tough in general; and he said he would have 
me a $1,000 before Christmas" (R. 54). ·Plaintiff told 
the defendant at that time that he would put his men 
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back on the job as soon as he had the money. Finally, 
on January 12, plaintiff called upon Mrs. Merrill and 
she gave him a check for $500. (Exhibit 4). Plaintiff 
called the defendant and told him that if he would pay 
him an additional $500 he would go back to work ( R. 
55, 56) . The court expressly found that between No· 
vember 1, when the plaintiff's invoice was rendered, 
and January 12, plaintiff repeatedly demanded pay· 
ment and the defendant consistently and repeatedly 
refused to pay any part of the amount due. The court 
expressly found "that the payment of the $500 to 
plaintiff . . . was not on the condition that [plaintiff] 
immediately return to work . . . but said amount was 
paid with the understanding that the defendant would 
pay or cause to be paid to plaintiff an additional $500 
before plaintiff would return to work" (Finding No. 
5, R. 21). 
The value of the work done was $2010.90. After 
the $500 credit, there was due and owing plaintiff 
$1510.90 for services rendered and materials furnished 
to that time (see Exhibits 2, 3; Finding No. 4) . The 
court found that when the defendant failed to pay 
plaintiff's invoice of November 1, 1960, or at least 
when he failed and refused to pay the sum of $1,000 
.which plaintiff had agreed to accept as a condition to 
returning to work, "such failure constituted a breach 
of the agreement between the parties and justified 
plaintiff in refusing to complete said work" (Finding 
No. 8, R. 23}. 
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At approximately the time the plaintiff left the 
job, the "rough plumbing" was inspected by the inspec-
tor for Salt Lake County and the work was approved 
(R. 101}. 
At the trial, the defendant attempted to establish 
that the plaintiff stopped working because the sewer 
line immediately outside the house 'Yas higher than the 
location where the connection could be made from th~ 
pipes coming from one of the bathrooms. Plaintiff tes-
tified, however, and defendant did not deny that the 
sewer line was being dug by defendant's men and that 
they left the job before plaintiff had. Moreover, the 
practice in the industry is that a plumber extends the 
sewer pipeline only five feet from the building and the 
expense of connection from that point to the sewer 
is borne by the owner (R. 166). Of interest on this 
point is the fact that defendant wanted to charge plain-
tiff app~oximately $460.00 for digging a trench to the 
point where the sewer could be connected ( R. 94) ; 
whereas the normal charge was $2.50 per foot, defend-
ant admitting that he had paid that amount only 
two years previously on the sa1ne house. It is undis-
puted that defendant did not tell the plaintiff that 
the footings in which plaintiff was installing the plumb-
ing were lower elevation than the sewer connections 
at the time the contract was signed. 
Defendant testified that he had been required to 
pay at least $2531.00 to complete the plumbing job. 
(This testimony is smnewhat difficult to follow but 
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he was claiming at least the following amounts: $1616.07 
to Christensen (R. 93, 99; Exhibit 15); $500.00 cash 
to Christensen, (R. 93, 53, 102, 105) ; $255.00 to Eng-
land Plumbing, (R. 93) ; and $460.00 for the trench to 
Lake Hills Memorial (R. 94). His testimony, however, 
was consistently and substantially impeached. The court 
found that the defendant failed to establish that the 
failure of the plaintiff to complete the plumbing work 
contemplated by the agreement received as Exhibit I 
was the proximate result of any act or neglect of the 
plaintiff, and that the defendant failed to establish 
that the fair cost of completing the work described in 
the agreement would have exceeded the contract price. 
The court further found that the defendant had not 
fairly attempted to mitigate damages (Finding No.6; 
R. 220). The evidence on these points will be discussed 
in more detail under Point II of this brief. 
Although finding in accordance with plaintiff's 
testimony that plaintiff's failure to complete the con-
tract resulted fro1n defendant's breach, the court found 
that plaintiff- was not entitled to recover any attorney's 
fees (Finding No. 7, R. 22). Exhibit 1 provides that 
"Purchaser agrees to pay any expense incurred by the 
Seller after Purchaser's breach of this contract, includ-
ing cost of repossession and reasonable attorney's fees. 
Interest at B1o to be charged upon delinquent pay-
ments." (Exhibit 1, para. 6.) 
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT I. 
THE COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT 
THE PARTIES AGREED THAT PLAINTIFF 
WAS TO BE PAID MONTHLY AS THE 
WORK PROGRESSED~ 
The written contract between the parties was left 
blank under the heading: "Payments to be Made as 
Follows:". The court therefor appropriately received 
evidence as to the .parties' intentions on this term of 
the agreement. This court held in Burt v. Stringfellow 
et ux (1914) 45 Ut. 207, 143 P. 234; see also Udy 
v. Jensen (1924) 65 Ut. 95, 222 P. 597, that the func-
tion of the trial court was to determine the intentions 
of the parties. Since the written agreement did not 
have any provisions on this particular item, the intention 
of the parties must be determined by consideration of 
the circumstances of the parties and their testimony 
as to what occurred at the- time the contract was signed 
(32 C.J.S. 1027, Evidence Section 1013). Respondents 
cite Maw v. Noble (1960) 10 Ut. (2d) 440, 354 P. (2d) 
121, for the proposition that the contract should be 
construed against the plaintiff since he was its author. 
But the court held in that case that "The primary and 
fundamental. rule is that the- contract must be looked 
at realistically in the light of the circumstances under 
which it w~s entered into, and if the intent of 'the parties 
can be ascertained with reasonable certainty, if must 
be given effect." cf. Craine v. Hagenbarth (1910) 37 
Ut. 69, 106 P. 945. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT 
SHOULD BE SUSTAINED SINCE THEY 
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE. 
This court has stated many times that Findings of 
Fact by the trial judge will not be disturbed so long 
as they are supported by substantial evidence. Lowe v. 
Rosenlof (1961) 12 Ut. (2d) 190, 364 P{2d) 418; 
Child v. Child {1958) 8 Ut. (2d) 261, 332 P (2d) 981. 
(a) Appellant does not seriously challenge Judge 
Hanson~s Findings of Fact. It is significant that the 
appellant here does not suggest that Judge Hanson's 
Findings are not supported by the evidence. The appel-
lant makes a broad argument on the facts de· novo as 
though the factual conflicts had not been resolved at 
the trial level. Sustaining of the Findings by respondent 
therefore, is in a sense, superfluous. 
It should be pointed out, however, that on the 
critical issue as to whether the -parties agreed orally 
that defendant would pay plaintiff monthly, plaintiff's 
testimony was direct and clear. He stated unequivocably 
that he explained to defendant that he billed on his 
jobs every 30 days and expected customers to pay by 
the lOth of the month so that he could meet his olvn 
obligations (R. 38, 60-61). 'Vhile ~Ir. Merrill's testi-
mony was to the contrary, his statements were sub-
stantially and consistently iinpeached. 
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Plaintiff and the other witness called in his behalf, 
William J. Clawson, testified directly and positively 
as to the actual items of material and number of hours 
per day that he spent on the defendant's premises. The 
reasonable value of the work was in accordance with 
plaintiff's practice, buttressed by his 20 years as a 
licensed plumber. The witness called by the defendant. 
Mr. Christensen, admitted that the plaintiff's work 
was approved by the County Inspector and that the 
rough plumbing was usually approximately 65Cjo of the 
total cost of a job. The contract price was $2981.00. 
Sixty-five per cent of that amount would have been 
$1937.65. The total amount of the work performed 
and materials furnished by the plaintiff was valued 
by him at $2110.90. Of this sum, $288.14 were extras. 
Thus the reasonable value placed by the plaintiff on 
the rough plumbing required by the contract was 
$1802.72, approximately $130.00 less than Mr. Chris-
tensen testified would have been a normal price for 
such services and materials. 
Taken as a whole, the record sustains the findings 
of the trial court without r~gard to the fact that the 
defendant w~s thoroughly impeached. 
(b) The. positions of the defendant were substan-
tially conflicting and his personal testimony was i11~­
peached. The positions and testimony of Mr. Merrill 
were in such conflict with each other that any findings 
based on them would have been subject to the most 
serious criticism. While not exhaustive, the following 
list of inconsistencies illustrate his total want of candor: 
13 
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( 1) Merrill testified on direct examination 
that the only conversations he had with plaintiff 
about money was when plaintiff called at the mor-
tuary on or about January 12. He at first denied 
that he had ever received a statement from lHr. 
McCarren on November 1 ( R. 135) . On cross-
examination, his counsel admitted for him that 
on his deposition he testified that he had received 
McCarren's statement of November 1 (R. 136, 
137). 
( 2) Merrill claimed he had paid Mr. Christensen 
$1616.07 for materials (R. 93; see also Exhibit 
15) ; whereas, Mr. Christensen stated that the de-
fendant furnished all of the materials (R. 99). The 
only amount that defendant paid Mr. Christensen 
was $500 (R. 153), and that check bounced (R. 
118; see also Exhibit 7). After Christensen's tes-
timony, the defendant grudgingly admitted that 
he hadn't paid Mr. Christensen anything for ma-
terials (R. 102, 105). 
( 3) Merrill testified that he wrote plaintiff a 
letter telling him in substance and effect to do the 
work or he would hire somebody else (R. 156). 
Such a letter would have to have been written prior 
to the middle of January because that is when the 
defendant hired l\Ir. Christensen to cmnplete the 
job. Yet defendant admitted that he had never 
complained to the defendant about the job in any 
way prior to March 7, after plaintiff had demanded 
14 
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payment and referred the claims to counsel for 
collection ( R. 137-138 ; Exhibit 15) . 
( 4) Defendant denied that he knew that the 
County Inspector approved the basic plumbing 
and that he had discussed the matter with Chris-
tensen ( R. 150) . 
( 5) Merrill is claiming that he lost tenants 
from substantially the middle of December and 
that he was extremely anxious to have the job 
cmnpleted; yet he admits that he never complained 
.to the plaintiff in any manner about plaintiff's 
performance on the job until after he had re-
ceived a demand letter from plaintiff's counsel 
(R. 137-138; Exhibits 14 and 15). 
( 6) Merrill testified that he had built three or 
four million dollars worth of buildings (R. 132-
133), yet he didn't know that the practice in the 
construction industry was that the elevation of 
sewers was determined by the general contractor 
rather than the plumber (R. 134; cf. R. 165). 
(7) Merrill was forced, on cross examination, 
to admit that most ·af the items which he claimed 
he had paid for consisted of duplications of the 
items which were on the premises prior to the time 
when plaintiff quit the job. The duplication of items 
claimed by the defendant on his ,counterclaim were 
proved from his own exhibits (R. 140-147). 
(8) After extensive cross examination where 
15 
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defendant was required to identify numerous items 
in detail that he wanted credit for on his counter-
claim in addition to the items that were listed in 
the contract between the parties (Exhibit 1 ; R. 
139-147), defendant then denied that any items 
went into the premises in addition to those described 
in the original agreement ( R. 158) . 
( 9) Defendant repeatedly made inconsistent 
statements as to whether demand was made for 
payment (R. 161-162). 
( 10) Merrill, whose occupation was a morti-
cian (R. 132) testified that plaintiff's work was 
improper and that charges were made by the 
plumbers to correct some of it (R. 92), but Mer-
rill's expert witness, Christensen, who had been in 
the plumbing business for many years, testified 
as to the various items in dispute: "It wasn't the 
fault of the plumber" (R. 104-105), explaining 
that errors made by other subcontractors had re-
quired some changes in the plumbing. 
( 11 ) Merrill admitted that he did not tell 
plaintiff when the contract was signed that the 
elevation of the line running from one of the bath-
rooms was lower than the existing line to the sewer 
(R. 147) ; yet he now wants to charge plaintiff 
$460.00 (R. 94) for the entire cost of running the 
line from five feet outside the house, which, ac-
cording to industry practice, would terminate the 
plumber's reSJ>Onsibility (R. 166) to the point of 
16 
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connecting the sewer, which Merrill testified to 
variously was "80 feet" (R. 94), "60 to 70 feet" (R. 
122). The proposed charge was calculated at $12 
per hour credited by Lake Hills Memorial (R. 151, 
152). His original cost for laying the sewer was 
only 50c p.er foot (R. 157) and the normal in-
dustry charge at the present time does not exceed 
$2.50 per foot. 
In sum, and taken as a whole, defendant's con-
tentions are simply not believable. The trial judge's 
rejection of them was not only warranted; it was re-
quired by the record. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN--FAILING TO 
AWARD PLAINTIF~., AN ATTORNEY'S 
FEE. 
The law is well settled that where a contractor 
completes a part of the work agreed upon and leaves 
the premises because of non-payment by the owner, 
the contractor is entitled to payment on ·a, ·quantu1n 
meruit basis for the work he did perform, even though 
he is not entitled to all of the benefits of the contract. 
Lowe v. Rosenlof (1916) 12 Ut.) 2d) 190, 364 P (2d) 
418; Ryan v. Curlew Irrigation and Rese.rvoir- Co. 
(1909) 36 Ut. 382, .104· P. 318; Eckes v. Luce ( ) 
70 Okl. 67,.173 P. 219, 17-A· C.J.S. 828, Contracts, 
Section 511. When the defendant failed to pay the 
17 
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amount of the November I billing, plaintiff had an 
immediate cause of action for the work performed at 
that time. The defendant was in default of the contract. 
Respondent does not contend that he should recover 
profits for the work which he did not perform. But, 
on the other hand, defendant should not be entitled to 
benefit from his own breach. It is submitted that the 
contract itself provides that in the event of breach, the 
defaulting party should pay collection costs, including 
attorney's fees, and that the court should have awarded 
attorney's fees in ratio to the damages sustained by the 
plaintiff at that time. Plaintiff should not be required to 
complete the job simply to enable himself to recover at-
torney's fees. Defendant has already breached. The 
argument has particular cogency where the defendant 
has repeatedly promised plaintiff money and then 
failed to perform. 
It is suggested that this court can fix attorney's 
fees in accordance with the experience of the court 
or the schedule of the Bar Association without addi-
tional evidence, and that upon remand, the lower court 
could be instructed to amend the judgment fixing fees 
without a further hearing. 
CONCLUSION 
The Findings of Fact of the trial judge are sup-
ported by the evidence, and the decision rendered on 
the merits of the case was in accordance with applicable 
legal principles. Since the defendant violated the con· 
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tract and required plaintiff to sue to obtain recovery 
under its provisions, the defendant should be required 
to pay reasonable costs of collection, including counsel 
fees. With the modifications suggested by the respond-
ent's cross appeal, the judgment of the trial court 
should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS 
22nd day of November, I 963. 
GEORGE M. McMILLAN 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondevt 
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